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Abstract
Background: The annual James Arthur lecture series on the Evolution of the Human Brain was
inaugurated at the American Museum of Natural History in 1932, through a bequest from a
successful manufacturer with a particular interest in mechanisms. Karl Pribram's thirty-ninth
lecture of the series, delivered in 1970, was a seminal event that heralded much of the research
agenda, since pursued by representatives of diverse disciplines, that touches on the evolution of
human uniqueness.
Discussion: In his James Arthur lecture Pribram raised questions about the coding of information
in the brain and about the complex association between language, symbol, and the unique human
cognitive system. These questions are as pertinent today as in 1970. The emergence of modern
human symbolic cognition is often viewed as a gradual, incremental process, governed by
inexorable natural selection and propelled by the apparent advantages of increasing intelligence.
However, there are numerous theoretical considerations that render such a scenario implausible,
and an examination of the pattern of acquisition of behavioral and anatomical novelties in human
evolution indicates that, throughout, major change was both sporadic and rare. What is more,
modern bony anatomy and brain size were apparently both achieved well before we have any
evidence for symbolic behavior patterns. This suggests that the biological substrate underlying the
symbolic thought that is so distinctive of Homo sapiens today was exaptively achieved, long before
its potential was actually put to use. In which case we need to look for the agent, perforce a cultural
one, that stimulated the adoption of symbolic thought patterns. That stimulus may well have been
the spontaneous invention of articulate language.
Background: James Arthur and the James 
Arthur lecture series
Born in Ireland in 1842 and raised in Glasgow, Scotland,
James Arthur immigrated to New York City in 1871.
Skilled in mechanics and gear-cutting, he established a
profitable career in the manufacture and repair of machin-
ery of diverse types, in the course of which he founded a
number of successful businesses and received patents on a
variety of mechanical devices. Throughout his life he
maintained a particular interest in horology, the science of
measuring time. Early in the twentieth century James
Arthur began an association with the American Museum
of Natural History, as a result of which his interest in time-
keeping expanded to evolutionary time and his fascina-
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and delicate mechanism of all, the human brain. His curi-
osity about how human beings came to be the behavio-
rally extraordinary creatures they are led ultimately to a
bequest to the American Museum that, following his
death in 1930, permitted the establishment of the annual
distinguished lecture series, the James Arthur Lectures on
the Evolution of the Human Brain. The first lecture in the
James Arthur series was delivered on March 15, 1932, by
Frederick Tilney, a distinguished neurologist who was
Chairman of the Department of Neurology at Columbia
University Medical Center from 1920 to 1935, and who is
perhaps best remembered for his bold prediction that "We
will by conscious command evolve cerebral centers which
will permit us to use powers that we now are not even
capable of imagining." In retrospect, it is evident that Dr
Tilney's chosen title, The Brain in Relation to Behavior, accu-
rately predicted the wide-ranging scope that has character-
ized lectures in the James Arthur series ever since.
Despite their diversity, however, few James Arthur presen-
tations have ranged as widely as Karl Pribram's thirty-
ninth lecture in the series, What Makes Man Human, deliv-
ered on April 23, 1970. In what must have seemed like a
very short hour (alas, I was not there to witness it: Pri-
bram's was almost the last James Arthur Lecture to be
given before I joined the American Museum, and the
speaker selection committee, in 1971), Pribram's seminal
ruminations ran the gamut from the nature of informa-
tion coding and the brain as machine, to the algorithms
on which neural motor mechanisms function, through
meaning and symbol and symbol-formation and finally,
via a detour into chimpanzee communication, back to
language and the symbol-mediated construction of mean-
ing. All serving as prologue to his brief but pregnant
answer to the question posed in his title: "man's brain is
different in that it makes imperative the productive use of
linguistic signs symbolically and linguistic symbols signif-
icantly" [ref. [1]](see page 31). In one short talk Pribram
elegantly, compactly and comprehensively articulated an
agenda that has underpinned much subsequent research
on the compelling but infuriatingly elusive question of
what it is that makes people human.
Discussion
Perhaps predictably, the "what makes us human" ques-
tion has in recent years given rise set many researchers to
the introspective and often obsessive task of compiling
laundry-lists of human behavioral uniquenesses, as exem-
plified by Donald Brown's book Human Universals [2]. But
while this is superficially an attractive approach to under-
standing exactly what it is that makes us different from all
other organisms, it really gets us nowhere. Partly this is
because such lists can never be exhaustive. There is always
something else to add: only we play bingo, only we grow
bonzai plants, or wear lipstick, or whatever. And who is to
say which activity in this potentially infinite list is the crit-
ical one, or even if any particular list includes that crucial
activity – should one exist at all. Mainly, though, this
approach to the question of what makes us different leads
us up a blind alley because, as Karl Pribram evidently
knew back in 1970, all of our peculiar activities stem from
the more generalized underlying faculty that, in his fifty-
fourth James Arthur Lecture of 1985, Alexander Marshack
dubbed "the human capacity" [3]. Everything in our lists
is effect, not cause. Still, many evolutionary psychologists
have grasped at such listings of "key" human behavioral
attributes as sources for the construction of a huge variety
of just-so stories depicting the bizarre or merely unusual
behaviors of modern human beings as lingering and no
longer functional adaptations to conditions that reigned
in the ancestral "environment of evolutionary adapted-
ness" [e.g. refs. [4,5]]. In turn, this mindset has given rise
to notions of a "modular" evolution of the human cogni-
tive capacity, whereby natural selection has led step-by-
step to the gradual emergence of the modern human
mind via the accretion of new and increasingly specialized
aspects of intelligence [4,6]. Following Tooby and Cos-
mides (in ref. [4]), Mithen [6] has likened the human
mind and its many proposed modules to a Swiss Army
knife with many different blades, each module likely
posessing "its own specific form of memory and reason-
ing process" [6](see page 43).
To the reductionist human mind this mechanistic expla-
nation of human intelligence, like the stories that result
from it, is undeniably attractive. We are a storytelling spe-
cies, and the notion of natural selection as the inexorable
propulsive force behind our own most distinctive
attribute makes a compelling story. Yet a moment's
thought is enough to indicate that evolutionary reality
must be much more nuanced than this narrative suggests.
Take the concept of natural selection itself. The basic
notion here is that "fitter," or better adapted, individuals
will outreproduce the less fit, and thus that their heritable
advantages will become commoner in the consequently
evolving population. On the face of it, in any species in
which more offspring are produced than survive to repro-
duce themselves this process looks not merely plausible,
but inevitable. Yet this reasoning really only works when
we think of beneficial characteristics as existing and evolv-
ing in isolation from others. The reality is that each organ-
ism is an integrated whole, made up of huge numbers of
mostly polygenic traits that are typically specified by plei-
otropic genes that may be variably expressed. And natural
selection can by its very nature only vote up or down on
the reproductive success of the whole individual. It cannot
single out individual features, still less particular genes, to
favor or to eliminate. Yet this is the assumption on which
the modular notion of brain/mind evolution depends. InPage 2 of 6
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each attribute under consideration somehow exists sepa-
rately from the entire organism in which it is embedded,
and as if each attribute has had an evolutionary history
independent not only of its possessors, but also of the
other traits that together make up the functioning whole.
Of course, some features of the organism may well make
an absolutely critical contribution to reproductive success,
and thus be individually subject to strong natural selec-
tion. But very probably such attributes are limited largely
to those that are central to the reproductive process itself.
It is, for example, very likely to be no accident that testis
size is consistently greatest in those primate species with
polygamous mating systems. Chimpanzee males compete
vigorously for females, and it is very highly plausible that
their remarkably large testes result directly from a history
of sperm competition, a point forcefully made by Paul
Harvey in his 1990 James Arthur Lecture, Comparing
Brains. Gorilla males, on the other hand, may have
smaller testes because an excess of metabolically expen-
sive reproductive tissue is unnecessary where single males
monopolize groups of females for extended periods of
time.
Still, most animal tissues and activities are not devoted to
reproduction per se but rather to economic ends, and nei-
ther affect nor reflect reproduction except in indirect and
complex ways. If an individual is not economically suc-
cessful it is highly unlikely to be reproductively successful,
and in this sense it is possible to contend that reproduc-
tive structures and activities are little more than a veneer
imposed on the basic economic machinery. Natural selec-
tion of the kind that promotes population change rather
than population stability probably acts typically to prop-
agate a very large and diverse subgroup of reproductively
superior individuals whose economic performance is not
necessarily any more than simply adequate. If individuals
are the target of natural selection, and populations are the
effective evolutionary units, then evolution cannot in
itself be a process of optimization of characters; and what
succeeds most of the time is merely what works. Repro-
ductive success often will not involve being the best, but
simply being good enough, in whatever respects happen
to be important in prevailing circumstances. Local diversi-
fication within any species is a critically important evolu-
tionary phenomenon, and in conjunction with speciation
it provides a crucial link between microevolutionary and
macroevolutionary processes; but most of the time, rather
than being directional, it seems to work within what (to
misappropriate a term from Niles Eldredge, ref. [7]) might
be termed a "sloshing bucket" principle, whereby genetic
and phenotypic frequencies move back and forth within
the containing wall of the species, the occasional overflow
being lost. The economic competition among entities that
appears to be of more routine evolutionary importance is
among species as wholes; and it is, after all, of very little
use in the long run to be the best adapted individual of
your species – whatever that may in practice mean – if
your entire species is being outcompeted into extinction.
There are, then, many theoretical as well as practical rea-
sons to reject the notion that human cognitive evolution
inevitably consisted of a sort of mental fine-tuning via the
continual accretion or modification of discrete modules,
each with its own neural circuitry. And if we are as a result
to abandon the notion of a human capacity that emerged
in a series of tiny discrete steps, we find ourselves essen-
tially back where Karl Pribram found himself in 1970,
looking for the origin of a much less specific neural com-
petence that underpins the entire range of our remarkable
cognitive skills. The question then becomes whether this
more general-purpose capacity arose through some sort of
gradually-acting feedback mechanism that mediated a
process of gradual refinement, or whether it represents a
true innovation, a quantitative rather than a qualitative
shift in cognitive functioning. Sheer brain size – which we
can determine, if only spottily, from fossil endocasts [8] –
turns out to be an inadequate measure of cognitive quality
[9,10]; so to evaluate this question we have to look at the
patterns of innovation that we see in the archaeological
record. This record, the archive of hominid behavioral
evolution as reflected in the material products of the hom-
inids concerned, was inaugurated by the invention of
stone tools some 2.6 million years ago.
The earliest stone toolmakers simply sought to obtain a
sharp cutting edge by striking one fist-sized cobble with
another. What the resulting sharp flake actually looked
like was not a consideration. Still, simple cutting flakes
were clearly a highly advantagous innovation, which saw
no major improvement for a million years. But at about
1.6 myr ago toolmakers began to make "handaxes." These
were implements of a standardized and symmetrical
shape that evidently corresponded to a "mental template"
that existed in the minds of the toolmakers before work
began. And while one might intuitively expect that, as pre-
sumptive evidence of a significant cognitive advance, this
radical innovation might have proved to be associated
with a new kind of hominid, it was in fact accomplished
by a hominid (albeit of a new kind) that had already been
around for several hundred thousand years before this
innovation was made. Appearing on the scene at a little
under two million years ago, this hominid species, most
commonly known as Homo ergaster, contained the first
hominids that were of essentially modern body size and
build, and that were thus radically different anatomically
from their predecessors. Yet its initial representatives con-
tinued to display technological behaviors that were effec-
tively identical to those that their much more archaically-Page 3 of 6
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million years and more. Still, even with brains a little big-
ger than those of their diminutive precursors – though
still at best not much more than half the size of ours today
– members of Homo ergaster were the first hominids to be
truly emancipated from the forest edge and woodland
habitats to which their precursors were largely confined.
And, still wielding only crude stone tools, they rapidly
spread far beyond Africa.
Following the invention of the handaxe, there is once
again a long wait for the next major technological innova-
tion, wherein a stone "core" was carefully shaped until a
single blow would detach a more or less finished tool.
This, too, surely signifies another notching-up in hominid
cognitive complexity. And again, this invention came long
after a new kind of hominid had shown up in the fossil
record, at about 600 thousand years (600 kyr) ago in
Africa and shortly thereafter in Eurasia. It was hominids of
this new species, Homo heidelbergensis, that some 200 kyr
later apparently introduced such important novelties as
the building of shelters and the regular domestication of
fire in hearths. There is, however, nothing in the archaeo-
logical record of these hominids that convincingly sug-
gests symbolic activities. As ever, the pattern is of a total
disconnect between the arrival of new kinds of hominid
and the appearance of new kinds of stone tools. And sig-
nificant change, whether behavioral or anatomical, con-
tinued to be not only sporadic, but rare.
Perhaps the most accomplished practitioners of prepared-
core toolmaking were the members of Homo neandertha-
lensis. By virtue of a large fossil and archaeological record
it is this species, which flourished in Europe and western
Asia following about 200 kyr ago, that provides us with
the best yardstick by which to judge the uniqueness of our
own species, Homo sapiens. But while the Neanderthals
had brains as large as ours are, invented the burial of the
dead, and probably took care of disadvantaged members
of society, they left little evidence to suggest that they pos-
sessed symbolic consciousness, the quality that Pribram
was to single out as the key to human cognitive unique-
ness, and to which numerous subsequent authors have
also pointed (see ref. [11]). And it was the Neanderthals
who, beginning some 40 kyr ago (and paralleled by simi-
lar but independent events that apparently occurred in
eastern Asia at about the same time), were somehow
driven to extinction in not much more than ten millennia
by arriving Homo sapiens whose existences were very
clearly drenched in symbol. These early European Homo
sapiens, known as the Cro-Magnons, created astonishing
art on the walls of caves. They carved exquisite figurines.
They decorated everyday objects, and made notations on
plaques of bone. They played music on bone flutes, and
without question sang and danced as well. In short, they
were us. And this complex material record they left behind
is distinguished most notably from those of their non-
African predecessors and contemporaries by its clear indi-
cations of a symbol-based mode of cognition. Like us, the
Cro-Magnons lived not in the world as presented to them
by Nature, but in a world they reconstucted in their own
minds and were thus able to manipulate.
Still, the Cro-Magnons were not the first creatures who
looked just like us. As suggested by such fossils as the Herto
1 and Omo Kibish 2 crania, the highly characteristic bony
anatomy of modern Homo sapiens may have had its roots
in Africa perhaps as long as 160–200 kyr ago [12,13], long
before we find the possible earliest intimations of sym-
bolic behaviors in that continent at about 100-80 kyr ago,
at such sites as Klasies River Mouth and Blombos Cave
[14]. Similarly, while anatomically modern Homo sapiens
shows up for the first time in the Levant at a little under
100 kyr ago, these hominids made stone tools virtually
indistinguishable from those made by the Neanderthals
who continued to persist alongside or in alternation with
them. The final disappearance of the Neanderthals from
the Levant came only following the appearance there
(apparently an indigenous development) of stone tools
equivalent to those the Cro-Magnons brought with them
fully formed into Europe. This appears to suggest that nei-
ther hominid species had an overall competitive advan-
tage as long as the behaviors of both could be described as
the most sophisticated extrapolations yet of the trends
toward increasing brain size and cognitive complexity – in
both lineages – that had preceded them. But once Homo
sapiens began to behave in a "modern" fashion, the Nean-
derthals were faced with an entirely unanticipated phe-
nomenon. And with its advent the rules of the game
changed entirely. With its acquisition of symbolic con-
sciousness Homo sapiens became an irresistible force in
Nature, intolerant of competition from close relatives and
possessed of the ability to indulge that intolerance.
There is nothing in the record just summarized to suggest
that the acquisition of modern symbolic consciousness
marked the culmination of a gradual trend through time,
under the beneficent supervision of natural selection. Cer-
tainly, the acquisition of modern human cognition was
based on what had gone before, and could not have hap-
pened without it. But the event itself marked a qualitative
leap, rather than a small final accretionary step in an inex-
orable process of refinement. Some studies have pointed
to hints in the earlier record of certain aspects of behavior
that we commonly associate with modern humans [15];
but very likely straws in the wind such as blade and point
production, long-distance exchange of materials, pigment
grinding, and shellfishing (all of them essentially eco-
nomic activities) merely point to a complex form of cog-
nition that was nonetheless not symbolic. In this contextPage 4 of 6
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increase in the average size of hominid brains over the
past two million years. For while the minimalist taxon-
omy preferred by most paleoanthropologists has made it
possible for many to assume a linear trend in this respect,
what we are more probably seeing are the averaged effects
of the preferential survival of larger-brained Homo species.
Nonetheless, there was undeniably something about
members of the genus Homo, or even of the family Homi-
nidae, that predisposed them to the metabolically expen-
sive process of brain enlargement; and knowing what that
something was will certainly be crucial to fully under-
standing how modern human cognition was acquired.
All this notwithstanding, large brains by themselves are
clearly not enough to assure symbolic consciousness.
Neanderthals had brains of modern human size – indeed,
with an endocranial capacity of 1740 ml, one Neander-
thal had the largest fossil hominid brain ever reported –
but, cognitively sophisticated as they doubtless were, they
failed to leave convincing evidence of symbolic behaviors,
certainly in "pre-contact" times. Perhaps more remarka-
bly, this was also true for the first anatomically modern
humans. The earliest potential Homo sapiens fossils in
Africa are associated with remarkably unsophisticated
stone artifacts, and the early moderns of the Levant some
90 kyr ago made stone tools just like those of the Nean-
derthals, with little if any sign of symbolic behaviors. So,
at least as far as can be told from an admittedly indirect
and incomplete record, there was a very considerable
time-lag between the acquisition of modern anatomy and
the expression of modern behavior patterns, putatively as
long ago as 75 kyr or more in Africa and most dramatically
expressed in Europe following about 40 kyr ago. It has
proposed that an enabling genetic change, the effects of
which were limited to brain activity, may have occurred
and spread within Homo sapiens in the period following
about 50 kyr ago. However, the spread would have had to
have been very rapid indeed, and there is no independent
suggestion of massive population replacement. More
likely the structural neural capacity that underwrites the
faculty for symbolic thought emerged with the substantial
biological reorganization that accompanied the emer-
gence of Homo sapiens as a readily recognizable anatomi-
cal entity, at some point over 150 kyr ago. That potential
then lay long undiscovered, until it was released by what
must have been a cultural rather than a biological stimu-
lus.
Karl Pribram [1] identified a close relationship between
symbolic cognition and language. He saw linguistic sen-
tences as codes constructed by predication, a symbolic
process that involved placing "linguistic signs into a con-
text dependent frame" [1](see page 26). Predication is in
turn "a statement of belief," which may exist in various
degrees of certainty. And it is "this process of making state-
ments of certainty which is unique to man" [1](see page
27). For Pribram, what made the cognition of human
beings different from any other known is the "reciprocal
interaction between sign and symbol." Pribram proposed
this linkage in the context of asking just what it is about
the human brain that makes symbolic thought possible
(for which his answer was the "massive cortico-cortical
connectivity" noted by another James Arthur lecturer,
Norman Geschwind [16], added to the ubiquity of cor-
tico-subcortical connections). But in the context of the
emergence of symbolic cognition (as opposed to its sub-
strate, which must obviously already have been present),
it is equally notable that the invention of language (or at
least of those elements of language dependent on symbol-
ism) is the most plausible releasing factor. Language itself
cannot have appeared entirely de novo. It clearly
descended in some way from sophisticated earlier forms
of vocal communication, the details of which are actively
debated [e.g. [17,18]]. But articulate language equally
clearly represents a qualitative leap away from any other
form of such communication that we know of. And it
should be noted that, by the time that we have any good
inferential evidence for language use, the vocal apparatus
necessary for speech production was already in place; for,
if there is any correspondence at all between this activity
and the production of symbolic artifacts and signs of com-
plex manipulation of the environment, the transition to
language evidently took place subsequent to the appear-
ance of anatomically modern Homo sapiens. Language is
the ultimate symbolic activity, involving as it does the cre-
ation of intangible symbols and their recombination in
the mind to allow the asking of questions such as "what
if?" And (unless its most important role is as an interior
conduit to thought, rather than as a means of communi-
cation) language is in addition a communal property,
which makes it more credible in the role of releaser than
other suggested facilitators of symbolic thought such as
theory of mind [e.g. [19]], which are internalized.
But whatever it may have been that ushered in the begin-
nings of symbolic thought in a Homo sapiens that had, like
all other organisms, lived until then in a concrete external
world rather than in one which it constantly mentally
remade, it is clear that symbolic thought itself cannot have
been propelled into existence by natural selection. Indeed,
natural selection is not a creative force in the sense that it
stimulates novelty; it can only act on variations that have
come into existence spontaneously, and independently of
context. This is not to deny the potential power of natural
selection to mold populations under certain circum-
stances; but there is an argument to be made that all useful
novelties – indeed, any novelties at all – have to arise not
as adaptations but as exaptations: in the broad sense, as fea-
tures not acquired in the context of the function to whichPage 5 of 6
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they will eventually be put. No surprise here: everyone can
agree that nothing arises for anything, and that selection
can only work with what is already there. Moreover, once
arisen, novelties may persist in populations for no better
reason than that they do not get in the way, whether or
not new uses for them might ultimately be discovered.
This places the origin of our vaunted human cognitive
capacities squarely in the arena of emergence: the chance
acquisition in a compound organ system of a level of
complexity that is greater than the sum of its individual
components. This is a notion that is entirely in harmony
with Karl Pribram's vision of 1970; and that perhaps, in
removing evolutionary fine-tuning from the equation,
makes it easier to understand his coda [1](seepage 32), a
quote from A. J. Heschel: "to be human is to be a prob-
lem" [20](see page 105).
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